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4I.  Introduction
A legal regime of several counter-terrorism conventions 
provides a legal framework for the international war on terror.1
The most important aspect of this international legal regime is 
the commitment of states to bring terrorists to justice by 
prosecuting them or extraditing them to countries willing and 
able to prosecute.2 As part of this commitment to extradite or 
prosecute terrorists, states have agreed to investigate and if 
appropriate arrest suspected terrorists found within their 
territory.3 If countries fail to investigate alleged terrorists, 
or fail to prosecute or extradite them when their investigations 
yield incriminating evidence, the counter-terrorism legal regime 
will become obsolete.4 The war on terror will lose an important 
international law ally, and distrust and lack of cooperation 
among states will likely take its place.5
The dispute between Venezuela and the United States over 
the extradition of alleged terrorist Luis Posada Carriles poses 
a challenge to the reliability and effectiveness of the counter-
terrorism regime.6 Posada Carriles, a Cuban-born anti-Castro 
militant with a long history of violent acts against Cuban 
interests in Latin America, entered the United States illegally 
in March, 2005.7 On June 15, 2005, Venezuela filed a request for 
his extradition, citing as legal basis the 1923 United States-
Venezuela Extradition Treaty, the 1971 Montreal Convention for 
5the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (“Montreal Convention”), and the 1998 Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (“Terrorist Bombings 
Convention”).8 Venezuela wants to try Posada Carriles, a 
naturalized Venezuelan, for the 1976 bombing of a Cuban civil 
aircraft over Barbados, which took the lives of 73 people.9
The Department of State forwarded Venezuela’s extradition 
request to the Department of Justice’s Office of International 
Affairs (OIA) as early as September 8, 2005.10 The OIA, however, 
has not yet acted on the request.11 Neither the Department of 
State nor the Department of Justice (DOJ) has communicated with 
Venezuela regarding Posada Carriles’ extradition, despite 
repeated claims by Venezuela that the United States is ignoring 
the request and harboring a terrorist.12 
On May 17, 2005, officers of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) detained Posada Carriles and initiated 
deportation proceedings against him.13 Posada Carriles accepted 
his deportability before an immigration court, but moved for 
deferral of removal to Venezuela, arguing that he would suffer 
torture in Venezuela if the DHS deported him to this country.14 
On September 26, immigration judge William L. Abbott found that 
Posada Carriles more likely than not would face torture in 
Venezuela.15 The United States has an obligation under the 
Convention against Torture to refrain from deporting or 
6extraditing persons to countries where they may suffer torture 
or inhumane treatment.16 Judge Abbott granted Posada Carriles’ 
motion.17 The DHS’ Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
is currently looking for a country other than Venezuela where to 
deport Posada Carriles.18 
This comment explores the obligations of the United States 
under the Montreal Convention and Terrorist Bombings Convention 
in the case of Posada Carriles.  Part II presents the relevant 
provisions of these conventions and summarizes the extradition 
law and procedure of the United States.19 Part III (a) argues 
that both the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions apply 
in this case.20 Part III (b) proposes that the United States has 
a duty to investigate expeditiously Venezuela’s allegations that 
Posada Carriles masterminded the 1976 bombing of the Cuban 
aircraft, and to report promptly the results of the 
investigation to Venezuela.21 Part III (c) argues that the 
removal proceedings against Posada Carriles do not satisfy the 
United States’ duty to investigate.22 Finally, part III (d) 
concludes that the United States has failed to conduct the 
expeditious investigation that the Montreal and Terrorist 
Bombings conventions require.23 
The United States should take prompt actions to investigate 
Venezuela’s allegations and inform Venezuela of the results of 
the investigation.24 This comment predicts that if the United 
7States fails to take these actions, it will also violate the 
duty to extradite or prosecute.25 The United States should 
codify the duty to investigate and report to avoid future 
violations.26 If the United States fails to investigate 
Venezuela’s allegations and, if appropriate, extradite or 
prosecute Posada Carriles, the international community will lose 
confidence in the counter-terrorism regime, rendering it mostly 
ineffective.27 
II. Background
a. International Obligations 
Both the United States and Venezuela are parties to the 
Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings Convention.28 The
Montreal Convention became enforceable between the two states in 
November, 1983.29 The Terrorist Bombings Convention became 
enforceable between them in September, 2003.30 
The Montreal Convention makes it an international crime to 
destroy or attempt to destroy civil aircrafts in service.31 The 
Terrorist Bombings Convention criminalizes violent attacks 
against places of public use, including public transportation 
systems.32 Public transportation systems include places, 
conveyances and instrumentalities used to deliver transportation 
services to the public.33 
Both the Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention require states to establish jurisdiction over the 
8covered offences when the alleged perpetrator is present in 
their territory.34 They also obligate states to investigate 
allegations that an offender is present in their territory, and 
to report the results of the investigation to states with 
jurisdiction over the offender.35 
Offences under these conventions constitute extraditable 
crimes.36 Both instruments direct states to consider the 
offences incorporated into all existing extradition agreements 
among them, and to include the offences as extraditable crimes 
in all of their future extradition agreements.37 The conventions 
require states to extradite alleged offenders or submit their 
cases to domestic authorities for the purpose of prosecution.38 
The Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions also impose a 
duty upon the parties to provide one another “the greatest 
measure of assistance” in investigations and proceedings against 
suspected offenders.39 
The United States and Venezuela are also parties to the 
Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (“Inter-American 
Convention”).40 The Inter-American Convention became enforceable 
between them on November 2, 2005.41 The Inter-American 
Convention obligates states “to afford one another the greatest 
measure of expeditious mutual legal assistance” in the 
investigation and prosecution of offences under the Montreal 
Convention and Terrorist Bombings Convention.42 
9b. United States Law 
 Federal courts have jurisdiction to try terrorists who 
commit acts of violence against civil aircrafts, regardless of 
the terrorist’s nationality and where the offence takes place.43 
The United States, however, does not have to exercise 
jurisdiction in every case.44 The United States may extradite 
the suspect to a country with stronger relations to the suspect 
or the crime.45 
The United States receives extradition requests through the 
Department of State.46 The Department of State determines 
whether a legal basis exists for the extradition and whether the 
documents submitted meet all applicable formalities.47 The
Department of State then forwards the request to the OIA.48 The 
OIA reviews the request to determine whether the evidence 
supports probable cause to believe that the person subject to 
the request committed the offence for which the requesting state 
seeks extradition.49 If the OIA considers that enough evidence 
exists to support a probable cause finding, it brings 
extradition proceedings before a United States magistrate in the 
district where the person subject to the extradition request is 
present.50 The magistrate conducts a probable cause inquiry and 
revises any pertinent provisions of the relevant extradition 
agreement to decide whether the person is extraditable.51 If the 
magistrate finds the person extraditable, she certifies the 
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decision to the Department of State.52 The Department of State 
makes the final determination whether to extradite the person. 53 
Countries can raise allegations that a person who has 
committed an offence under the Montreal Convention or the 
Terrorist Bombings Convention is present in the United States by 
means other than a formal request for extradition.54 Thus, in 
different situations other government offices may be in charge 
of conducting the investigation and providing the report that 
the conventions require.55 However, when a request for 
extradition is the conduit that a foreign country chooses to 
raise an allegation that a terrorist is in the United States, 
the OIA is the body which domestic law charges with the 
investigation of the allegations raised.56 The OIA must inquire 
into the substance of the allegations and determine whether to 
honor the extradition request by bringing extradition 
proceedings before a United States magistrate.57 
The law does not impose an obligation on the OIA to process 
extradition requests in an expeditious manner or within a 
specific time period.58 The OIA may process an extradition 
request within days of having received the request from the 




a. The Montreal and Terrorist Bombings Conventions Apply to 
the Case of the Extradition of Posada Carriles 
The 1976 bombing of the Cuban airplane falls within the 
scope of the Montreal Convention.60 Violent attacks against 
civil aircrafts constitute the specific object of this 
instrument.61 The downing of the Cuban airplane also falls 
within the scope of the Terrorist Bombings Convention.62 The
Terrorist Bombings Convention covers violent attacks against 
public transportation systems.63 A public transportation system 
includes conveyances and instrumentalities used in 
transportation services available to the public.64 A civil 
airplane engaged in the transportation of members of the public, 
as was the Cuban airplane in this case, is an instrumentality 
and thus part of a public transportation system.65 
Both the Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention apply to the case of Posada Carriles even though the 
offence for which Venezuela wants to try Posada Carriles 
occurred before the conventions became enforceable between the 
United States and Venezuela.66 Extradition treaties generally 
apply retroactively.67 The Montreal and Terrorist Bombings 
conventions focus on extradition as a means of bringing 
terrorists to justice.68 The central provisions of the 
conventions focus on making the covered offences extraditable 
crimes and facilitating the extradition of offenders.69 States 
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must consider the covered offences incorporated in all 
extradition treaties in force between them and must include the 
offences as extraditable crimes in all of their future 
extradition agreements.70 States must also extradite or 
prosecute alleged offenders.71 Because the conventions’ main 
objective and central provisions deal with extradition as a 
means of fighting terrorism, and extradition agreements 
generally apply to offences which took place before the 
agreements’ date of entry into force, the Montreal Convention 
and Terrorist Bombings Convention apply to Venezuela’s 
extradition request.72 
b. The Duty to Investigate and Report Requires the United 
States to Undertake an Expeditiousness Investigation and 
Make a Prompt Report in the Case of Posada Carriles 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that 
treaty interpretation should focus on the plain meaning of the 
treaty’s terms in light of the treaty’s objectives, and should 
take into account other rules of international law binding upon 
the parties in dispute.73 The objective of the Montreal 
Convention and Terrorist Bombings Convention is to deter 
terrorism by bringing terrorists to justice.74 The Inter-
American Convention obliges the United States and Venezuela to 
provide one another expeditious assistance in the investigation 
of offences under the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings 
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conventions.75 The language of the Montreal and Terrorist 
Bombings conventions, read in light of the conventions’ 
objective and the United States’ duty of expeditious assistance 
under the Inter-American Convention, supports the interpretation 
that the United States must conduct an expeditious investigation 
of Venezuela’s charges against Posada Carriles and promptly 
inform Venezuela of the investigation’s results.76 
The objective of the Montreal Convention and Terrorist 
Bombings Convention is to deter and prevent future acts of 
terrorism by bringing terrorists to justice.77 An expeditious 
investigation of Venezuela’s charges against Posada Carriles is 
necessary to further this objective.78 Failure by the United 
States to conduct an expeditious investigation would show lack 
of resolve in bringing terrorists to justice.79 Such a failure 
would run afoul the objective of the conventions.80 
The Inter-American Convention requires the United States 
and Venezuela to extend one another “the greatest measure of 
expeditious mutual legal assistance” in connection with 
investigations of offences under the Montreal and Terrorist 
Bombings conventions.81 This obligation, as a rule of 
international law binding upon the United States and Venezuela, 
informs the interpretation of the Montreal and Terrorist 
Bombings conventions as they apply between Venezuela and the 
United States.82 The duty to afford one another expeditious 
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assistance in bringing terrorists to justice effectively adds a 
requirement of expeditiousness to the duty to investigate and 
report of the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions.83 
The language of the Montreal Convention supports the 
conclusion that the duty to investigate and report requires the 
United States to conduct an expeditious investigation and make a 
prompt report in the case of Posada Carriles.84 The Montreal 
Convention directs states to “immediately make a preliminary 
enquiry into the facts” whenever they have reasons to believe 
that a terrorist may be present within their territory.85 The 
provisions also mandate that the state conducting the 
investigation “promptly report its findings” to states with 
jurisdiction over the alleged terrorist.86 The use of the terms 
“immediately” and “promptly” to qualify the actions that states 
must take strongly suggests a duty to undertake these actions 
expeditiously.87 When read with the objective of the convention 
in mind, and considering the obligation of the United States to 
afford Venezuela expeditious assistance under the Inter-American 
Convention, this language supports the interpretation that the 
duty to investigate and report requires the United States to 
conduct an expeditious investigation and make a prompt report to 
Venezuela.88 
The Terrorist Bombings Convention provides that upon 
obtaining information that an alleged terrorist is within their 
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territory, states must “take such measures as may be necessary 
under its domestic law” to investigate the information.89 This 
language does not contain specific terms suggesting an 
obligation to investigate expeditiously.90 However, unless the 
duty to investigate contains a requirement of expeditiousness, 
the United States could unnecessarily prolong the conclusion of 
the investigation.91 This would show unwillingness to bring 
terrorists to justice, thus defeating the objective of the 
convention.92 With this in mind, and considering the United 
States’ duty of expeditious assistance under the Inter-American 
Convention, it is reasonable to interpret the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention’s duty to investigate as requiring the United States 
to undertake an expeditious investigation of Venezuela’s charges 
against Posada Carriles.93 
The obligation to report appears in the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention in almost the same terms as the equivalent provision 
in the Montreal Convention.94 The Terrorist Bombings Convention 
provides that states must “promptly inform” other interested 
parties about the results of the investigation.95 The convention 
therefore obligates the United States to report promptly the 
findings of the investigation to Venezuela.96 
c. The Removal Proceedings against Posada Carriles Do Not 
Satisfy The Duty to Investigate and Report in the Case of 
Posada Carriles 
16
The immigration proceedings which the DHS brought against 
Posada Carriles do not satisfy the duty to investigate and 
report.97 In the removal proceedings against Posada Carriles the 
immigration court considered only whether Posada Carriles would 
suffer torture in Venezuela.98 The court did not investigate 
Venezuela’s allegations that Posada Carriles masterminded the 
1976 terrorist attack, as the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings 
conventions require.99 
The immigration court’s decision that the Torture 
Convention prevented Posada Carriles’ deportation to Venezuela 
has no binding effect on the pending extradition request.100 The
immigration court’s decision does not prevent the OIA from 
investigating Venezuela’s allegations and processing the 
extradition request.101 
d. The United States is in Violation of the Duty to 
Investigate and Report 
 The OIA is in charge of investigating the allegations that 
Venezuela raised in the request for the extradition of Posada 
Carriles.102 However, the broad discretion that the OIA enjoys 
in processing extradition requests is causing the United States 
to violate its duty to investigate and report in an expeditious 
manner.103 Venezuela’s extradition request is pending at the OIA 
while the DHS is looking for a country other than Venezuela 
where to send Posada Carriles.104 If the DHS deports Posada 
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Carriles, the United States will lose jurisdiction over him.105 
This means that the United States will lose the opportunity to 
prosecute or extradite Posada Carriles to a country willing and 
able to prosecute.106 Since the objective of investigating 
Venezuela’s allegations is to decide whether Posada Carriles 
should face justice in Venezuela, undergo prosecution in the 
United States, or go free, investigating Venezuela’s allegations 
after Posada Carriles’ deportation will not serve the purpose of 
the duty to investigate and report.107 The fact that the United 
States may lose jurisdiction over Posada Carriles while the 
extradition request is pending at the OIA shows that the OIA’s 
timing in investigating Venezuela’s allegations is at odds with 
the duty to investigate and report in an expeditious manner.108 
IV.  Recommendations
The United States needs to take prompt action to 
investigate the allegations that Venezuela raised in the request 
for the extradition of Posada Carriles.109 The OIA should
immediately undertake to process Venezuela’s extradition 
request.110 The DOJ or the Department of State needs to 
communicate with Venezuela and give Venezuela assurances that 
the OIA is investigating the allegations.111 Failure to take 
these actions may result in violation of the duty to extradite 
or prosecute under both the Montreal Convention and Terrorist 
Bombings Convention.112 United States law should require the OIA 
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to process extradition requests in an expeditious manner when 
the requesting country raises the Montreal Convention or the 
Terrorist Bombings Convention as legal grounds for the 
extradition.113 
a. The United States Should Immediately Investigate 
Venezuela’s allegations and Communicate to Venezuela the 
Results of the Investigation 
The OIA needs to take prompt action to process Venezuela’s 
extradition request.  Processing Venezuela’s request will 
necessarily involve investigating the allegations that Posada 
Carriles participated in the 1976 bombing of the Cuban 
airplane.114 This action will bring the United States into 
compliance with the duty to investigate Venezuela’s charges 
against Posada Carriles.115 
The DOJ or the Department of State should promptly 
communicate with Venezuela and give Venezuela assurances that 
the OIA is investigating the allegations raised in the 
extradition request.116 The DOJ or the Department of State 
should also inform Venezuela of the results of the investigation 
as soon as the OIA completes the investigation.117 Moreover, if 
the OIA brings extradition proceedings in court, the DOJ or the 
Department of State should promptly communicate to Venezuela the 
extradition magistrate’s decision whether or not to certify 
Posada Carriles as extraditable.118 This series of 
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communications, along with the OIA’s actual investigation of the 
extradition request, would bring the United States back into 
compliance with the duty to investigate and report under the 
Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions.119 
b. Failure to Take Prompt Action May Cause the United States 
to be in Violation of the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute  
Undertaking to process Venezuela’s extradition request 
without delay will not only bring the United States into 
compliance with the duty to investigate and report but may also 
avoid causing the United States to be in violation of the duty 
to extradite or prosecute under the Montreal and Terrorist 
Bombings conventions.120 If the DHS deports Posada Carriles in 
the absence of a finding by the OIA that the charges against him 
lack evidentiary support, the United States would have let an 
alleged terrorist go free without first establishing that the 
allegations against him are unfounded.121 This is precisely what 
the duty to extradite or prosecute, together with the duty to 
investigate and report, seeks to avoid.122 If the DHS deports 
Posada Carriles in the absence of an investigation confirming 
that the allegations against him lack merit, the United States 
will violate the duty to prosecute or extradite.123 
c. The United States Should Codify the Duty to Investigate 
and Report to Prevent Future Violations  
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The United States should implement legislation that 
requires the OIA to investigate expeditiously allegations raised 
in extradition requests when the requesting country invokes the 
Montreal Convention or the Terrorist Bombings Convention as 
legal grounds.124 Such legislation should also require the OIA 
to communicate promptly the results of the investigation to the 
requesting state.125 In the alternative, the United States may 
charge a federal office other than the OIA with undertaking the 
required investigation and report in an expeditious manner.126 
The implementation of legislation in either form would likely 
expedite the investigation and report of terror suspects and 
eliminate unnecessary delays that may cause the United States to 
violate its obligation to investigate and report in the 
future.127 
V.  Conclusion
The case of the extradition of Posada Carriles could 
undermine the effectiveness of the international counter-
terrorism regime.128 The United States has failed to act 
expeditiously to investigate Venezuela’s allegations of 
terrorism against Posada Carriles.129 If the United States, 
which has emerged as a leader in the worldwide struggle against 
terrorism, fails to investigate these allegations, the 
international community may lose confidence in the legitimacy of 
the United States’ efforts to bring terrorists to justice.130 
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This could create a state of distrust and lack of cooperation 
detrimental to the success of the war on terror.131 
1 See generally Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, art. I, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 
U.N.T.S. 105 (making the unlawful seizure of aircraft an 
international crime); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation [hereinafter Montreal 
Convention], art. I, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S 
177 (proscribing violent attacks against civil aircrafts or 
persons within with the intent to cause death, bodily harm or 
destruction); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents, art. II, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 13 
I.L.M 41 (criminalizing killings, kidnappings, assaults and 
other forms of violence against internationally protected 
persons and their official premises, private accommodations and 
means of transportation); International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages, art. I, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 
18 I.L.M 1456 (prohibiting the seizure of persons with the 
intent to compel a third party, particularly a state or 
international organization, to do or abstain from doing any 
acts); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence 
at Airports Serving Civil Aviation, art. II, Feb. 24, 1988, S. 
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Treaty Doc. No. 100-19, 27 I.L.M 627 (criminalizing acts of 
violence against facilities of airports serving international 
civil aviation or persons within); Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, art. III, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668 (making 
unlawful seizures or attacks against ships an international 
crime); Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, art. II, Dec. 9, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/109, 39 I.L.M. 
270 (making financing of terrorism an international crime); 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
[hereinafter Terrorist Bombings Convention], art. II, Jan. 9, 
1998, 1998 U.S.T. Lexis 204, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/164 
(criminalizing unlawful use of explosive or lethal substances 
against places of public use or persons within); Inter-American 
Convention against Terrorism [hereinafter Inter-American 
Convention], art. I and II, June 3, 2002, AG Res. 1840, OAS AG, 
32nd Sess., OAS Doc. XXXII-O/02 (providing a comprehensive 
framework for regional cooperation in combating terrorism).  See
also Christopher C. Joyner, International Extradition and Global 
Terrorism:  Bringing International Criminals to Justice, 25 Loy.
L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 493,539 (2003) (contending that while 
there is not an integrated counter-terrorism legal system, the 
existing counter-terrorism conventions form a framework for 
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international cooperation in the suppression and prosecution of 
terrorism).   
2 See Ayaz R. Shaikh, A Theoretic Approach to Transnational 
Terrorism, 80 Geo. L.J. 2131, 2159 (1992) (arguing that because 
the goal of the counter-terrorism conventions is the prosecution 
of terrorists, a central tenet of the conventions is the 
principle aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute)); 
John P. Grant, Terrorism on Trial:  Beyond the Montreal 
Convention, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 453, 457-58 (2005) 
(expressing that the duty to extradite or prosecute is the core 
obligation, the cornerstone, and the most important common area 
of the counter-terrorism conventions); Joyner, supra note 1, at 
539-40 (referring to the extradite-or-prosecute formula as a 
preeminent obligation at the heart of the counter-terrorism 
conventions); John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission 
of International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal 
Prosecution, Harv. Hum. Rts. J., Spring 1999, at 3 (noting that 
in many anti-terrorism conventions the emphasis on the duty to 
prosecute or extradite is strong).  See generally M. Cherif 
Bassiouni and Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare:  The Duty 
to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law Pt. I, § 6 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) (arguing that the duty to 
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extradite or prosecute is a rule of customary international law 
and a jus cogens rule).   
3 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI (imposing a duty 
on states parties to investigate any information alleging the 
presence of a terrorist within their territories); Terrorist 
Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (establishing the 
same obligation).  See also Grant, supra note 2 (expressing that 
the duty to extradite or prosecute requires investigating 
allegations of terrorism). 
4 See Grant, supra note 2, at 458 (suggesting that unless states 
undertake to prosecute or extradite in good faith, the 
obligation to prosecute or extradite may become only a façade of 
justice); Joyner, supra note 1, at 539-40 (proposing that the 
critical ingredient for the success of the anti-terrorism regime 
is political will to convert international obligations into 
practice).  Professor Joyner further contends that unless 
governments are willing to cooperate in suppressing terrorism, 
the legal regime fails as an option. Id.
5 See Joyner, supra note 1, at 540 (noting that governments are 
very receptive to domestic and international political 
pressures, and in a world of conflicting political, ideological, 
and economic situations, governments will find it difficult to 
mobilize the domestic political will to make the international 
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anti-terrorism regime work properly).  See also George B. 
Newhouse Jr., The Long Arm of the Law, 25 L.A. Law. 32, 34 
(observing that when a requested state fails to honor a foreign 
extradition request due to lack of political will, the 
requesting state may, out of frustration, use confrontational 
tactics such as kidnapping the wanted person). 
6 See Unwelcome Visitor, Fort Worth Star Telegram, May 19, 2005, 
at B (proposing that allowing Posada Carriles to stay in the 
United States or giving him free passage to another country will 
make a mockery of the United States’ stance on terrorism and 
seriously jeopardize America’s credibility); Curt Anderson, 
Anti-Castro Militant Creates Dilemma For Washington.  U.S. 
Credibility Comes Under Challenge, Tampa Trib., June 13, 2005, 
at Metro (quoting Peter Kornbluh, director of the Cuba program 
of the National Security Archive Research Organization at George 
Washington University, stating that Posada Carriles’ presence in 
the United States threatens to undermine the credibility of 
American foreign policy in the war on terror); text accompanying 
note 4 (suggesting that failure to prosecute or extradite terror 
suspects will undermine the effectiveness of the international 
anti-terrorism regime). 
7 See Cronologia de Actividades de Posada Carriles, El Universal,




ml (offering a chronology of Posada Carriles’ militant 
activities, which include attempting to blow up a Cuban or 
Soviet ship in the Mexican port of Veracruz in 1965; bombing a 
Cuban civil aircraft over Barbados in 1976, although Posada 
Carriles denies any involvement in this act; carrying out a 
series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997; and attempting to 
assassinate Fidel Castro in Panama in 2000, for which he was 
convicted and served four years in prison).  In 2004, then-
Panamanian president Mireya Moscoso granted Posada Carriles 
presidential pardon. Id. See Peter Kornbluh, A Safe Harbor for 
Luis Posada Carriles, NACLA Rep. on Am., Jan. 1, 2006, available 
at 2006 WLNR 525091 (commenting that Posada Carriles entered the 
country with a false passport hoping to obtain political 
asylum). 
8 See Wayne S. Smith, Sheltering Terrorists, Sun Sentinel (Fort 
Lauderdale), Oct. 27, 2005, at 27A (showing doubt that the 
United States will seriously entertain the extradition of Posada 
Carriles, and predicting that he will be in custody for some 
time under charges of illegal entry and then set free); Roraima 
Albornoz, Wanted Terrorist Luis Posasa Carriles:  U.S.A. Offered 
no Discretion Under the Law!, VHeadline.com, January 24, 2006, 
available at http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=47748 
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(reporting that in a statement the Venezuelan embassy in the 
United States expressed that the Bush administration had no 
option under the Montreal Convention but to extradite or 
prosecute Posada Carriles). 
9 See In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-708, U.S. 
Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 5, available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_ 
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (observing that Posada Carriles stood 
trial in Venezuela and the court acquitted him of plotting the 
bombing of the Cuban airplane).  An appeals court, however, 
overturned this decision and ordered retrial after finding that 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case.  Id. Posada 
Carriles escaped from prison when retrial was pending. Id.
10 See Venezuela Reclama a EEUU Extradicion del “Bin Laden 
Latinoamericano”, El Universal, Sept. 28, 2005, at Nacional y 
Politica, available at
http://buscador.eluniversal.com/2005/09/28/pol_ava_28A615407.sht
ml (quoting the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States 
saying that the Department of State sent the extradition request 
to the Justice Department for processing, but the Justice 
Department chose to store the request in a drawer instead of 
bringing extradition proceedings before a judge). 
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11 See Security Council Briefed by Chairmen of Three Anti-
Terrorism Committees; Strengthening Cooperating, Assistance to 
States Among Issues Raised, U.S. Fed. News, Feb. 21, 2006, 
available at 2006 WLNR 3089853 (reporting the remarks of 
Venezuela’s diplomat Fermin Toro Jimenez before the U.N. 
Security Council that the unwillingness of the United States to 
process Venezuela’s request for the extradition of Posada 
Carriles shows that the United States has a double standard in 
the war on terror); Wilfredo Cancio Isla, Exigen la Extradicion 
de Posada a Venezuela, El Nuevo Herald (Miami), Jan. 26, 2006, 
at A, available at 2006 WLNR 1393920 (alleging that the DOJ is 
just following orders from George W. Bush, who wants to treat 
the case of Posada Carriles as a simple immigration case). 
12 See Albornoz supra note 8 (reporting that on November 9 the 
Department of State sent the Venezuelan embassy a diplomatic 
note stating that it would soon send questions and concerns 
regarding the extradition of Posada Carriles, but that as of 
January 24, 2006, the embassy had received nothing); Cancio 
Isla, supra note 11 (quoting Venezuela’s lawyer in Washington 
accusing the United States of proteting a terrorist); Bruce 
Zagaris, U.S. Court Bars Deportation of Terrorist Suspect to 
Cuba or Venezuela, Int’l Enforcement L. Rep., Dec. 2005, at 
Extradition (indicating that the United States and Venezuela are 
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in a rhetoric battle on counter-terrorism cooperation in the 
case of Posada Carriles). 
13 See Madeline Baro Diaz, Vanessa Bauza and Ruth Morris, U.S. 
Arrests Suspect in Terror Attacks on Cuban Plane, Hotels, Sun 
Sentinel (Fort. Lauderdale), May 18, 2005 (asserting that DHS 
agents arrested Posada Carriles after he withdrew a petition for 
asylum in the United States and was preparing to leave the 
country).  See also In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-
419-708, U.S. Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 1, 
available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_ 
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (indicating that the immigration court has 
subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of Posada Carriles’ 
presence in the United States).   
14 See In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-708, U.S. 
Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 1-2, available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_ 
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (noting that Posada Carriles first denied 
his deportability alleging that he never gave up his status as a  
permanent resident in the United States, but subsequently 
conceded that he lost his permanent residency when he became a 
Venezuelan citizen).  Posada Carriles later conceded his 
ineligibility for withholding of removal based on his serious 
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nonpolitical criminal convictions outside the United States.  
Id. at 2.   
15 See id. at 6-7 (finding that in consideration of the strong 
cultural, political, and economic ties between Venezuela and 
Cuba, it was plausible that Venezuela would allow Cuban agents 
to interrogate and torture Posada Carriles in Venezuela). 
16 See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. III, April 18, 1988, S. 
Treaty Doc. 100-20, 23 I.L.M 1027 (providing that an inquiry 
into the possibility of torture in the country of deportation or 
extradition must take into account the existence in that country 
of a consistent pattern of human rights violations).  See also
Deferral of Removal under the Convention against Torture, 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.17 (2005) (codifying article III of the Convention 
against Torture). 
17 See In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-708, U.S. 
Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 5, available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_ 
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (observing that even terrorists or mass 
murderers qualify for deferral of removal if they prove that 
more likely than note they would suffer torture if deported). 
18 See U.S. Considering Moving Anti-Castro Activist to Third 
Country, Voice of Am., Jan. 25, 2006, available at WL 1422757 
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(noting that Posada Carriles’ attorney is seeking his 
provisional release while the DHS Office of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement looks for a third country where to deport 
Posada Carriles). 
19 See discussion infra Part II (introducing the provisions of 
the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions and the United 
States law and procedure that deal with the investigation of 
terrorists and the means to extradite or prosecute terror 
suspects). 
20 See discussion infra Part III (a) (contending that the 
Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions apply to the case of 
Posada Carriles even though the attack against the Cuban 
airplane took place before these conventions became enforceable 
between the United States and Venezuela). 
21 See discussion infra Part III (b) (arguing that the language 
of the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions, interpreted 
in light of the objectives of the conventions and the 
obligations that the United States and Venezuela undertook in 
the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, supports the 
conclusion that the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions 
impose on the United States a duty to investigate and report 
expeditiously in the case of Posada Carriles). 
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22 See discussion infra Part III (c) (contending that the removal 
proceedings against Posada Carriles did not involve an inquiry 
into Venezuela’s allegations and therefore does not constitute 
the type of investigation that the Montreal and Terrorist 
Bombings conventions require). 
23 See discussion infra Part III (d) (contending that the failure 
to act on Venezuela’s extradition request despite the 
possibility that the DHS may at any time deport Posada Carriles 
to a country other than Venezuela or Cuba puts the United States 
in violation of the duty to conduct an expeditious investigation 
and make a prompt report). 
24 See discussion infra Part IV (a) (suggesting that the OIA 
should promptly undertake to process Venezuela’s extradition 
request and that the DOJ or the Department of State should 
promptly communicate with Venezuela and assure this country that 
the OIA is investigating the allegations raised in the 
extradition request). 
25 See discussion infra Part IV (b) (arguing that if the DHS 
deports Posada Carriles in the absence of an investigation and 
finding that Venezuela’s charges lack merit, the United States 
will be in violation of  the duty to extradite or prosecute). 
26 See discussion infra Part IV (recommending that the United 
States implement legislation to require the OIA to process 
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extradition requests expeditiously when the requesting state 
invokes the Montreal Convention or the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention as basis for the extradition). 
27 See discussion infra Part V (predicting that unless the United 
States promptly undertakes to process Venezuela’s extradition 
request, the case of Posada Carriles will undermine the 
credibility of the United States in the war on terror and 
negatively affect the international community’s willingness to 
act together to fight terrorism). 
28 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1 (listing the United 
States and Venezuela as signatories); United Nations Office On 
Drugs and Crime, Chapter Four: Montreal Convention, at 95, 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Commonwealth_Chapter_4.
pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing that the United States 
and Venezuela ratified the Montreal Convention on November 1, 
1972, and November 21, 1983, respectively); United Nations 
Treaty Collection, International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombings, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing 
that the United States and Venezuela ratified the Terrorist 




29 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Chapter Four: 
Montreal Convention, at 90, 95, 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Commonwealth_Chapter_4.
pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing that the Montreal 
Convention entered into force on January 26, 1973, with the 
United States among the states that had already ratified the 
convention, but Venezuela did not ratify the convention until 
November of 1983). 
30 See United Nations Treaty Collection, International Convention 
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing 
that the Terrorist Bombings Convention entered into force on May 
23, 2001, but the United States and Venezuela did not ratify the 
convention until June 26, 2002, and September 23, 2003, 
respectively). 
31 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. I and IV (making 
the provisions of the convention applicable to all unlawful 
attacks against civil aircrafts in flight except when the 
aircrafts performs a military, customs or police service) 
32 Compare id. (covering only attacks against civil aircrafts in 
flight) with Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. 
II and III (covering acts of violence against the public or in 
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public places generally, including attacks against public 
transportation instrumentalities and conveyances).  See W. 
Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism,
Hous. J. Int’l L., Fall 1999, at 3, 27 (proposing that the 
Terrorist Bombings Convention is different from previous 
counter-terrorism conventions in that it criminalizes a 
terrorist technique rather than specific terrorist acts).  
33 See Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. I, ¶ 6 
(establishing that the phrase “public transportation systems” 
covers all facilities, conveyances and instrumentalities, 
whether publicly or privately owned, used to deliver 
transportation services to the public). 
34 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. V, ¶ 2 (directing 
states to establish jurisdiction over the offender when they do 
not extradite him to another state with jurisdiction under the 
convention to prosecute the offender); Terrorist Bombings 
Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶ 4 (same). 
35 Compare Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2 
(requiring a preliminary inquiry into the facts when a state, 
upon receiving information that an alleged offender is in its 
territory, takes the suspect into custody) with Terrorist 
Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2 and 6 
(requiring states to conduct an investigation of the facts upon 
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receiving information that an alleged offender is in their 
territory whether or not they detain the suspect). 
36 Compare Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. IX 
(requiring states to consider the provisions of any extradition 
treaty or other agreement among them to be modified to the 
extent that they are incompatible with the convention) with
Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (lacking an 
equivalent provision). 
37 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (providing 
that states which make extradition conditional on the existence 
of an extradition treaty may consider the convention as legal 
grounds for extradition in cases where they receive an 
extradition request from a state with which they do not have an 
extradition treaty); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 
1, art. IX (directing states to consider, if necessary, any 
covered offence to have taken place not only where the offence 
actually occurred but also in the territory of parties with 
jurisdiction under the convention). 
38 Compare Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. 
VIII, ¶ 2 (providing that in cases where the requested state 
only extradites its nationals subject to a condition that the 
requesting state will return them to serve their sentences in 
the requested state, such an arrangements will satisfy the 
37
 
requested state’s duty to extradite or prosecute) with Montreal 
Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (lacking a similar 
provision). 
39 Compare Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. XI (stating 
that the law of the state which receives a request for 
assistance applies in all circumstances) with Terrorist Bombings 
Convention, supra note 1, art. X (directing states to provide 
one another assistance in conformity with any mutual legal 
assistance treaties or arrangements existing among them or, in 
cases where no such treaties or arrangements exist, in 
accordance with their domestic law).  
40 See Organization of American States, Department of 
International Legal Affairs, A-66: Inter-American Convention 
against Terrorism, 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.or
g/DIL/treaties_and_agreements.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) 
(showing the United States and Venezuela as parties to the 
convention). 
41 See id. (showing that the Inter-American Convention entered 
into force on July 10, 2003, and Venezuela and the United States 




42 See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. II, ¶ 1(b) 
and ¶ 1(i) (stating that offences under the Montreal Convention 
and Terrorist Bombings Convention, among other counter-terrorism 
instruments, are also offences under the Inter-American 
Convention).  States parties must afford one another expeditious 
assistance in conformity with applicable international 
agreements in force among them or, in the absence of such 
agreements, in accordance with their domestic law.  Id., art. 
IX. 
43 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 32 (LexisNexis 2006) (establishing 
jurisdiction over offences under the Montreal Convention when 
they occur outside the United States against a foreign-
registered aircraft if the offender is a national of the United 
States or is found in the United States, or if a national of the 
United States was or would have been on board the targeted 
aircraft); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332f (LexisNexis 2006) (establishing 
jurisdiction over offences under the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention which take place outside the United States when the 
perpetrator is found in the United States). 
44 See United States v.  Lei Shi, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135-36 
(D. Haw. 2003), recons. denied, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (D. Haw. 
2005) (stating that under the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, an 
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international instrument similar to the Montreal and Terrorist 
Bombings conventions, the United States has discretion whether 
to extradite an offender or prosecute him in domestic courts). 
45 See Lei Shi, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-36 (commenting that the 
United States could extradite the offender to China, his country 
of nationality, or the Republic of Seychelles, where the ship 
that the offender attacked was registered, but the United States 
could also exercise jurisdiction and prosecute the offender in 
its domestic courts).  
46 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual 
[hereinafter USAM] 9-612 (1997) (stating that all United States 
extradition treaties require states to submit their extradition 
requests to the Department of State).   
47 See id. (indicating that the Department of State also examines 
the extradition request to identify potential foreign policy 
implications). 
48 See id. (explaining that if the extradition request is in 
proper order, the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department 
of State forwards it to the OIA along with a certificate 




49 See id., 9-613 (indicating that the OIA also conducts a second 
check to make sure that the request satisfies all the pertinent 
formalities). 
50 See id. (stating that the OIA, after evaluating the evidence 
supporting the allegations in the extradition request, forwards 
the request to the United States attorney in the district where 
the person subject to the request is present for the purpose of 
initiating extradition proceedings before a magistrate).  The 
OIA advises prosecutors at every stage of the extradition 
process.  Id.
51 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3184 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that, upon 
a finding that the evidence is sufficient to support the charges 
against the person subject to extradition, the magistrate may 
issue a warrant for the arrest of such person if the person is 
not yet in custody).  See also Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 
1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the duties of the magistrate 
judge in extradition matters and noting that, in addition to 
conducting a probable cause inquiry, the magistrate must assess 
whether any provisions of the instrument on which the requesting 




52 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3184 (indicating that the magistrate 
forwards the certificate of extraditability to the Department of 
State along with a copy of the testimony given in the case). 
53 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3184 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that the 
Department of State may deliver the extraditable person to the 
requesting country); Barapind, 225 F.3d at 1105 (explaining that 
the Secretary of State, out of humanitarian or other 
considerations, may refuse to extradite a person otherwise 
extraditable).  Barapind further explains that in some cases, 
particularly those where extradition would violate the 
Convention against Torture, the courts may review a Secretary of 
State’s decision to extradite).  Id. at 1106.  See generally M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition:  United States Law 
and Practice Ch. IX (4th ed., Oceana Publications Inc. 2002) 
(providing an in depth description and analysis of United States 
extradition procedures). 
54 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI (requiring no 
specific methods or channels for countries to raise allegations 
that a terrorist is present in the territory of a state party to 
the convention); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, 
arts. VII and XV (requiring states to cooperate in the 
prevention of terrorism by exchanging information whenever 
possible concerning the presence of terrorists or terrorist 
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organizations in their territories, but making no specifications 
about the methods or channels of communication that states 
should use in carrying out this obligation).  See also Inter-
American Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (mandating states 
to establish and enhance channels of communication to facilitate 
expeditious exchange of information concerning offences under 
the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions among other 
instruments). 
55 See 50 U.S.C.S. § 403-5d (LexisNexis 2006) (authorizing the 
transfer of foreign intelligence information to different 
domestic agencies for the purpose of investigating threats of 
terrorism). 
56 See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (indicating that the OIA 
reviews the evidence submitted with the extradition request to 
determine whether it supports probable cause to believe that the 
facts alleged in the request constitute an extraditable offence 
and the person sought in extradition committed the offence).  
See also Ethal A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States 
Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive 
Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 813, 818-20 (1993) 
(examining the formation and development of the OIA as the 
central office dealing with extradition and other international 
law matters); Bassiouni, supra note 53, at 760 (observing that 
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the OIA deals with all issues of cooperation in criminal matters 
among states). 
57 See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (noting that the OIA 
investigates and evaluates the evidence submitted in support of 
a request for extradition and acts on the weight and credibility 
of the evidence). 
58 See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006) (imposing 
no time requirements on the OIA concerning the processing of 
extradition requests); USAM, supra note 51, 9-602-22 (same). 
59 See 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006); USAM, supra note 51, 
9-602-22. 
60 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, arts. I and IV, ¶¶ 2-3 
(making the provisions of the convention applicable in all 
situations where the offender is in a state other than the state 
of registration of the aircraft or the state where the offence 
takes place). 
61 See id., pmbl. (announcing that the purpose of the convention 
is to facilitate appropriate measures for the punishments of 
those who commit unlawful acts of violence against civil 
aircrafts or passengers within).  See also Joyner, supra note 1, 
at 513 (explaining that during the 1960s the threat of 
terrorists targeting international flights became a serious 
concern to the members of the International Civil Aviation 
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Organization, and this concern prompted the negotiation and 
drafting of the Montreal Convention); Paul Stephen Dempsey, 
Aviation Security:  The Role of Law in the War against 
Terrorism, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 649, 651-57 (reviewing the 
history of hijackings and other violent attacks against civil 
aircrafts that gave birth to the Montreal Convention and its 
predecessor the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft). 
62 See Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. II 
(criminalizing violent attacks against public transportation 
systems).  The Terrorist Bombings Convention provides a 
comprehensive legal framework covering terrorist acts that 
already constitute offences under other counter-terrorism 
conventions.  Id., pmbl. 
63 Id., art. II.  
64 Id., art. I, ¶ 6.  
65 See Perez v. United States,  402 U.S. 146, 1150 (1971) 
(mentioning aircrafts as instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce); Tom Lyons, This Terrorist Suspect Has Much Reason to 
Feel Welcome in Florida, Sarasota Herald-Trib., May 19, 2005, at
B (noting that the Cuban civil airplane that exploded over 
Barbados in 1976 was bringing home young Cuban athletes). 
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66 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Chapter Four: 
Montreal Convention, at 90, 95, 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Commonwealth_Chapter_4.
pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing that the Montreal 
Convention entered into force between the United States and 
Venezuela in November of 1983); United Nations Treaty 
Collection, International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) (showing 
that the Terrorist Bombings Convention entered into force 
between the United States and Venezuela on September 23, 2003); 
discussion infra Part III (a) (arguing that because extradition 
treaties generally apply retroactively and the Montreal and 
Terrorist Bombings conventions focus on extradition as a tool to 
bring terrorists to justice, the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings 
conventions apply to offences that took place before the 
conventions entered into force). 
67 See Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F.2d 955, 956 (2d. Cir. 1927) 
(stating that extradition treaties apply to offences that take 
place prior to the treaty’s entry into force in the absence of a 
provision to the contrary); In the Matter of the Extradition of 
Othmar Ernst, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 710, at *38 (D. S.D.N.Y. 
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1998) (commenting that for more than a century the law has been 
that extradition treaties can be enacted or modified with 
retroactive effect). 
68 See Reisman supra, note 32, at 22, 28 (proposing that the 
Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings Convention are 
primarily extradition and judicial assistance treaties). 
69 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, arts. VII and VIII 
(establishing a duty to extradite or prosecute and providing 
that states can rely upon the convention as legal basis for 
extradition among themselves); Terrorist Bombings Convention, 
supra note 1, arts. XIII and IX (same).  See also Joyner, supra
note 1, at 502 (observing that in nearly all of the counter-
terrorism conventions, extradition takes the central role in law 
enforcement). 
70 Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII, ¶ 1; Terrorist 
Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. IX, ¶ 1. 
71 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2 
(mandating states immediately to make a preliminary inquiry into 
the facts when they take an alleged offender into custody); 
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1,2 
and 6 (requiring states parties to conduct an investigation of 
the facts upon receiving information that an alleged offender is 
in their territory even if they do not detain the suspect). 
47
 
72 See Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F.2d 955, 956 (2d. Cir. 1927) 
(noting that extradition treaties apply retroactively in the 
absence of a provision to the contrary); In the Matter of the 
Extradition of Othmar Ernst, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 710, at *38 
(D. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (commenting states can conclude or modify 
extradition treaties with retroactive effect).  See generally
Montreal Convention, supra note 1, arts. VII and VIII (giving 
extradition a central role in bringing terrorists to justice); 
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII and IX 
(same).  See also Reisman supra, note 32, at 22, 28 (proposing 
that the Montreal Convention and the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention focus primarily on extradition); Joyner, supra note 
1, at 502 (observing that extradition is central to all of the 
counter-terrorism conventions). 
73 See Convention on the Law of Treaties, [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention], art. XXXI, Jul. 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (establishing 
that for the purpose of interpretation of treaties, the context 
of a treaty comprises the text, including its preamble and 
annexes, and any agreements which the parties made in connection 
with the treaty). 
74 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (speaking of an 
urgent need for effective measures to punish terrorists in order 
to deter future terrorist attacks); Terrorist Bombings 
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Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (emphasizing the need for a 
comprehensive legal framework which will enhance cooperation 
among states in the prevention and punishment of terrorists).  
See also Joyner, supra note 1, at 539 (commenting that the end 
goal of the counter-terrorism conventions is the apprehension, 
prosecution and punishment of terrorists); Paul Stephen Dempsey, 
Aviation Security:  The Role of Law in the War Against 
Terrorism, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 649, 732 (2003) (observing 
that the counter-terrorism conventions’ reduction of the number 
of potential safe havens for terrorists appears to have 
contributed to a decline of aerial terrorism). 
75 See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, arts. II (b), II 
(i), and IX (requiring states to provide one another “the 
greatest measure of expeditious mutual legal assistance” in 
connection with the investigation and prosecution of offences 
under the Montreal Convention and Terrorist Bombings Convention 
among other counter-terrorism instruments).  
76 See discussion infra Part III (b) (arguing that the language 
of the conventions, when analyzed in light of the objective to 
deter terrorism by bringing terrorists to justice and the 
obligation of the United States and Venezuela under the Inter-
American Convention to afford one another expeditious 
assistance, supports the interpretation that the duty to 
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investigate and report requires the United States to investigate 
and report in an expeditious manner). 
77 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (expressing a 
need to punish terrorists to deter future terrorist attacks); 
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (calling for 
the enhancement inter-state cooperation in the prevention and 
punishment of terrorists).  See also Joyner, supra note 1, at 
539 (noting that the goal of the counter-terrorism conventions 
is the apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists); 
Barry Kellman and David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear
Window:  A Legal Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 667, 730 (1996) (suggesting that the goal of the 
duty to extradite or prosecute of the counter-terrorism 
conventions is to eliminate safe havens for terrorists); 
Dempsey, supra note 66, at 732 (observing that the counter-
terrorism conventions’ reduction of the number of potential safe 
havens for terrorists appears to have contributed to a decline 
in aerial terrorism).   
78 See Kellman and Gualtieri, supra note 82, at 730 (explaining 
that the duty to extradite or prosecute of the counter-terrorism 
conventions seek to eliminate safe havens for terrorists); 
Grant, supra note 2, at 458 (suggesting that unless states 
undertake to prosecute or extradite in good faith, the 
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prosecute-or-extradite formula fails to accomplish its objective 
of bringing offenders to justice); Joyner, supra note 1, at 539-
40 (proposing that the critical ingredient for the success of 
the anti-terrorism regime is political will to convert 
international obligations into practice). 
79 See Unwelcome Visitor, supra note 6 (suggesting that failure 
to investigate Venezuela’s allegations and either prosecute or 
extradite Posada Carriles will make a mockery of the United 
States’ stance on terrorism and seriously jeopardize America’s 
credibility); Curt Anderson, supra note 6 (proposing that Posada 
Carriles’ presence in the United States threatens to undermine 
the credibility of American foreign policy in the war on 
terror). 
80 See text accompanying note 4 (suggesting that failure to 
prosecute or extradite terror suspects will undermine the 
effectiveness of the international anti-terrorism regime). 
81 See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, arts. II (b), II 
(i), and IX (providing that states must carry out the obligation 
to afford one another expeditious assistance in accordance with 
mutual assistance agreements in force between them, or in 




82 Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. IX; Vienna 
Convention, supra note 79, art. XXXI, ¶ 3 (c).  See Oil 
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. LEXIS 11, 49-50 (Nov. 6, 
2003) (deciding that the application of relevant rules of 
international law in force between the parties to the dispute 
constitute an integral part of the International Court of 
Justice’s task of interpreting the treaty at issue); Coard et 
al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
109/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II/106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 40 (1999) (citing 
article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention as support for a the 
proposition that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
interprets international instruments in light of the 
international legal system in force at the time of the 
interpretation). 
83 Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, art. IX.  
84 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI (directly 
states to “immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the 
facts” when they suspect the presence of a terrorist in their 
territory). 
85 See id. (mandating the state where the alleged terrorist is in 
custody to notify other states with jurisdiction over him of the 
alleged terrorist’s arrest and the reasons for his detention). 
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86 See id. (requiring also that the state conducting the 
investigation communicate to other states parties with 
jurisdiction over the suspect whether or not it will exercise 
jurisdiction). 
87 See id. (providing also that custody of the alleged terrorist 
may continue only for such time as is necessary to initiate 
criminal or extradition proceedings against him).  See also
Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention 
Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 
I.C.J. 114, 122-23 (Apr. 14, 1992) (noting that after a grand 
jury of the United States indicted two Libyan citizens for the 
1988 bombing of a civil aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland, the 
United States and the United Kingdom issued a declaration 
calling on Libya to investigate the bombings and disclose 
promptly and in full all that it knows about the downing of the 
aircraft); S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992) 
(urging Libya to comply immediately with the United States and 
the United Kingdom’s request to investigate and disclose 
promptly the circumstances of the Lockerbie terrorist attack). 
88 Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI; Inter-American 
Convention, supra note 1, art. IX. 
89 Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶ 1. 
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90 Compare Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI (using the 
adverb “immediately” to qualify the action that states must 
take) with Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. 
VII, ¶ 1 (lacking a similar qualifier). 
91 See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006) (containing 
no duty to investigate expeditiously or within any specified 
time period); USAM, supra note 51, 9-602-22 (same). 
92 See text accompanying note 79 (explaining that the objective 
of the Terrorist Bombings Convention is to deter acts of 
terrorism by bringing terrorists to justice). 
93 Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII; Inter-
American Convention, supra note 1, art. IX. 
94 Compare Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, 
¶ 6 (“The State which makes the investigation...shall promptly 
inform” other states parties with possible jurisdiction over the 
suspect of the results of the investigation) with Montreal 
Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶ 4 (“The State which makes 
the preliminary inquiry...shall promptly report its findings” to 
other states parties with possible jurisdiction over the 
suspect). 
95 See Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶ 6 
(requiring also that the state conducting the inquiry indicate 
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to other states with jurisdiction over the suspect whether or 
not it intends to exercise jurisdiction). 
96 Id.
97 See generally In the Matter of Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-
708, U.S. Immigr. Ct., El Paso, Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005), available 
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_ 
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (addressing only the issue whether Posada 
Carriles more likely than not would suffer torture if deported 
to Venezuela).  The court did not inquire into Venezuela’s 
allegations that Posada Carriles masterminded the 1976 Cuban 
plane bombing.  Id. 
98 See id. (analyzing only the credibility of the testimonies 
about the likelihood that Posada Carriles would suffer torture 
if deported to Venezuela).      
99 See id. at 3 (showing that the DHS presented no evidence of 
any kind in the deferral of removal hearing); Montreal 
Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2 (requiring states 
to make a preliminary inquiry into the facts upon receiving 
information that an alleged offender is in their territory); 
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2 
and 6 (requiring states to investigate any information that an 
alleged terrorist is in their territory). 
55
 
100 See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006) 
(containing no provision which indicates that a decision of an 
immigration court is binding upon the State Department or the 
DOJ in extradition proceedings); USAM, supra note 51, 9-602-22 
(same).  See also Bassiouni, supra note 61, at 174 (commenting 
that a finding of political persecution by immigration 
authorities has no binding effect on extradition proceedings, 
and a similar decision by an extradition magistrate has no 
binding effect on deportation or asylum proceedings). 
101 See Bassiouni, supra note 61, at 174 (criticizing the fact 
that asylum proceedings, including withholding of removal, and 
extradition proceedings overlap and address common issues 
without legislative coordination).  Professor Bassiouni points 
out that even though deportation proceedings have no binding 
effect on am extradition magistrate’s decision that a person is 
extraditable and vice versa, a finding by immigration 
authorities that an alien would face persecution if deported 
binds the executive in the final decision whether to extradite 
such alien to the country where he would face persecution. Id.
at 174-75. 
102 See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (indicating that the OIA 
reviews the evidence submitted with the extradition request to 
determine whether it supports probable cause to believe that the 
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facts alleged in the request constitute an extraditable offence 
and the person sought in extradition committed the offence).  
See also Nadelmann, supra note 56, at 818-20 (examining the 
formation and development of the OIA as the central office 
dealing with extradition and other international law matters); 
Bassiouni, supra note 53, at 760 (observing that the OIA deals 
with all issues of cooperation in criminal matters among 
states). 
103 See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006) (imposing 
no time requirements on the OIA regarding the processing of 
extradition requests); USAM, supra note 51, 9-602-22 (same); 
discussion infra Part III (d) (contending that because the DHS 
may deport Posada Carriles to a country other than Venezuela or 
Cuba at any time, the OIA’s timing in investigating the 
allegations that Venezuela raised in the extradition request is 
at odds with the obligation to investigate and report in an 
expeditious manner). 
104 See U.S. Seeks a Country That Will Take Cuban, Belleville 
News Democrat, Mar. 23, 2006, at A (reporting that Posada 
Carriles will remain in immigration detention while efforts to 
send him to a third country continue); Venezuela Reclama a EEUU 
Extradicion del “Bin Laden Latinoamericano”, supra note 10 
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(quoting the Venezuelan ambassador alleging that the OIA is 
ignoring the extradition request). 
105 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 32(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2006) (establishing 
jurisdiction over offences under the Montreal Convention when 
the offender is found in the United States); 18 U.S.C.S. §
2332f(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2006) (establishing jurisdiction over 
offences under the Terrorist Bombings Convention when the 
perpetrator is found in the United States); In the Matter of 
Luis Posada Carriles, A-12-419-708, U.S. Immigr. Ct., El Paso, 
Tx. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 5, available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA_ 
DECISION3_9-26-05.pdf (mentioning no connection between the 1976 
plane bombing and the United States other than the alleged 
perpetrator’s presence in the United States).  
Compare Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. V, ¶ 2 
(directing states parties to establish jurisdiction when they do 
not extradite the alleged offender to any other country) with
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶ 4 
(mandating states parties to establish jurisdiction whey they do 
not extradite the alleged offender to another state party that 
has established jurisdiction over the alleged offender pursuant 
to article VI of the convention). 
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106 See U.S. Seeks a Country That Will Take Cuban, supra note 109 
(reporting that the DHS may soon deport Posada Carriles).   
107 See Grant, supra note 2 (suggesting that the duty to 
investigate is a necessary ingredient of the duty to extradite 
or prosecute); text accompanying note 82 (commenting that the 
objective of the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions is 
to prevent and deter terrorism by bringing terrorists to 
justice). 
108 See U.S. Seeks a Country That Will Take Cuban, supra note 109 
(indicating Posada Carriles may soon not be present in the 
United States); Venezuelan Diplomat Calls on U.S. to Extradite 
Cuban Militant, supra note 113 (noting that Venezuela is still 
unsuccessfully calling for Posada Carriles’ extradition).  See
also discussion supra Part III (b) (contending that unless 
states undertake to investigate expeditiously allegations that a 
terrorist is in their territory, they will fail to achieve the 
objective of the Montreal and Terrorist Bombings conventions of 
bringing terrorists to justice). 
109 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2 
(creating a duty to investigate allegations that a terrorist is 
present in the territory of a state party); Terrorist Bombings 
Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2 and 6 (same).  See
also discussion supra Part III (d) (arguing that the United 
59
 
States is in violation of the duty to investigate and report); 
discussion infra Part IV (b) (contending that unless the United 
States takes prompt action to investigate Venezuela’s 
allegations and report the findings, the United States will also 
be in violation of the duty to extradite or prosecute). 
110 See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (indicating that the OIA 
reviews extradition requests to determine whether they support 
probable cause and then decides whether to bring extradition 
proceedings before a federal magistrate); Venezuela Reclama a 
EEUU Extradicion del “Bin Laden Latinoamericano”, supra note 10 
(reporting that Venezuela alleges that the OIA is ignoring the 
extradition request). 
111 See text accompanying note 12 (reporting Venezuela’s 
complaint that the Department of State has failed to communicate 
with Venezuela regarding the extradition request). 
112 See discussion infra Part IV (b) (proposing that if the DHS  
deports Posada Carriles to a third country without a decision by 
the OIA that the charges against him lack evidentiary support, 
the United States would have let an alleged terrorist go free, 
thus violating the duty to extradite or prosecute). 
113 See discussion infra Part IV (c) (arguing that the United 
States should codify the duty to investigate and report to avoid 
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being in violation of this international obligation in the 
future). 
114 See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (stating that the OIA examines 
the evidence submitted with an extradition request to determine 
whether it supports probable cause to believe that the person 
sought in extradition committed the offence for which he is 
wanted).   
115 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 1 and 2 
(imposing a duty on states to investigate allegations that a 
terrorist is present in their territory); Terrorist Bombings 
Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2 and 6 (same). 
116 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 3 and 4 
(imposing several obligations on states parties to communicate 
with one another regarding the investigation of terrorists); 
Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, ¶¶ 1, 2 
and 6 (same).  See also Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. 
X (requiring states to afford one another the greatest degree of 
cooperation); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. 
X (same). 
117 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI, ¶¶ 3 and 4 
(imposing an obligation on states parties to report the results 
of their investigations); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra
note 1, art. VII, ¶ 6 (same). 
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118 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3184 (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring a finding 
of probable cause by a magistrate before the Department of State 
may surrender any person in extradition). 
119 Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI; Terrorist 
Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VII. 
120 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (obliging the 
state party where the alleged terrorist is present to extradite 
or prosecute the alleged terrorist); Terrorist Bombings 
Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (same); discussion infra
Part IV (b) (arguing that if the DHS  deports Posada Carriles 
without a decision by the OIA that the charges against him are 
unfounded, the United States would have let an alleged terrorist 
go free, thus violating the duty to extradite or prosecute)  
121 See USAM, supra note 51, 9-613 (indicating that the OIA 
examines the evidence submitted in support of extradition 
requests and draws conclusions about their weight and 
credibility).   
122 See text accompanying note 2 (proposing that the goal of the 
duty to extradite or prosecute is to bring terrorists to 
justice).     
123 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VII (requiring 
the state party where the alleged terrorist is present to 
extradite or prosecute the alleged terrorist); Terrorist 
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Bombings Convention, supra note 1, art. VIII (same); text 
accompanying note 2 (proposing that the goal of the duty to 
extradite or prosecute is to bring terrorists to justice).     
124 See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006) 
(containing no provisions requiring the OIA to process 
extradition requests within a specified period of time); USAM, 
supra note 51, 9-602-22 (same). 
125 See generally 18 U.S.C.S 3181-96 (LexisNexis 2006) 
(containing no provisions requiring the OIA to inform the 
requesting state of the results of the investigation of the 
allegations raised in the request for extradition); USAM, supra
note 51, 9-602-22 (same). 
126 See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. VI 
(making no specifications as to what type of domestic authority 
should investigate and report); Terrorist Bombings Convention, 
supra note 1, art. VII, ¶ 6 (same).  See also discussion supra
Part II (b) (noting that when a country raises allegations that 
an alleged terrorist is in the United States through channels 
other than a formal request for extradition, the OIA may not be 
in charge of conducting an investigation and making a report). 
127 See discussion supra Part III (d) (contending that the OIA 
has unnecessarily delayed the investigation of Venezuela’s 
allegations against Posada Carriles). 
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128 See text accompanying note 4 (explaining that unless 
countries show political will to bring terrorists to justice, 
the international counter-terrorism regime fails as a legal tool 
to bring states together in the war on terror); text 
accompanying note 6 (suggesting that the Posada Carriles case 
has damaged the credibility of the United States in the war on 
terror). 
129 See discussion supra Part III (d) (arguing that the OIA’s 
lack of action in the Posada Carriles case despite ongoing 
efforts by the DHS to deport Posada Carriles to a country other 
than Venezuela puts the United States in violation of the duty 
to conduct an expeditious investigation). 
130 See text accompanying note 6 (predicting that the Posada 
Carriles case will seriously damage the credibility of the 
United States’ efforts to fight terrorism). 
131 See text accompanying note 5 (expressing fear that states may 
easily disregard the international counter-terrorism regime out 
of frustration or lack of domestic political support). 
